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Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of a contest designer who chooses a starting time and
a deadline of the contest to maximize discounted total eﬀort by the contestants. Each
contestant secretly decides how much eﬀort to exert between the starting time and the
deadline. At the deadline, the contestant who exerted most eﬀort wins a prize, which
consists of the endowment of the designer and collected interest. The contest has a
unique Nash equilibrium. In the main model, the designer should announce the contest
immediately with a short deadline to promote intense competition. I analyze how the
optimal starting time and deadline change for a variable contest prize, diﬀerent types
of asymmetries, a Tullock lottery contest success function, and diﬀerent goal functions
of the designer.
1 INTRODUCTION
Contests are frequently used to promote competition, both within ﬁrms and between ﬁrms or individuals. Many contests share
the same temporal structure: the designer chooses when to announce the competition and speciﬁes the assessment rules, the
deadline, and the winner prize. All contestants can exert eﬀort between the announcement and the deadline, at which the best
performing contestant receives the prize.
Let me provide a few examples, which ﬁt the above description to discuss the scope of this paper. For instance, at schools
or universities, the teacher announces the day and the importance of the test and the students decide when and how much they
study. The best grade within their peer group is the “prize,” which yields prestige and might facilitate applications for the next
higher career level or scholarships. The teacher/school faces the following problems: When should the test be written (deadline)?
When should the teacher announce the date of the test (starting time)? How does the answer depend on the objective function
of the teacher?
In big law ﬁrms, promotion decisions are often taken in the form of a contest, that is, several associates compete for the prize
of becoming a partner. In this example, the starting time and prize are given by the beginning of the contract and the value of
becoming a partner, respectively. Thus, the relevant question is when the ﬁrm should take the “making partner” decision.
As a ﬁnal example, consider an innovation contest, for example, for improving a search algorithm. The designer faces a trade-
oﬀ between the expected quality of the algorithm and the deadline of the contest, which is the ﬁrst date at which she can use it.
Thus, she needs to ﬁnd the starting time/deadline/prize schedule, which maximizes her objective function.
The literature on the optimal duration in contests, however, is very scarce. Contest models such as all-pay auctions or Tul-
lock contests do not model the time dimension at all, whereas other contest models with unobservable actions abstract from
discounting and/or assume inﬁnite or exogenous deadlines.1
Instead, this paper treats the contest length as a choice variable of the designer. During the contest stage, participants decide
when to exert eﬀort, but cannot observe the rival's eﬀort decisions, that is, their interaction remains static. Equilibrium properties
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such as exerted eﬀort and winning probabilities, however, change depending on the contest duration. Thus, unlike the existing
static literature, I can study the optimization problem of a contest designer with a focus on the optimal starting time and deadline.
More precisely, I analyze the problem of an impatient contest designer who maximizes discounted expected total eﬀort by
two risk-neutral contestants; eﬀort is interpreted as a proxy for output. The designer has a ﬁxed monetary endowment available
for the contest.2 She chooses when to announce the contest and for how long to run the contest. At the deadline, the contestant
who exerted most eﬀort between the announcement and the deadline wins the prize, that is, the endowment and accumulated
interest. In case of a tie, the prize is allocated randomly or split equally.
In the ﬁrst step, I characterize the Nash equilibria of the contest for all starting time/deadline combinations in Propositions
1–3. For a ﬁxed starting time, a ﬁxed deadline (and a ﬁxed prize), the contest is essentially isomorphic to an all-pay auction with
a speciﬁc exponential bidding cost and a bid cap.
By changing the starting time and deadline, the designer inﬂuences the bid cap and the cost–prize ratio. There are two miti-
gating eﬀects: a larger deadline increases expected eﬀort, but due to the discounting, it also reduces the valuation of the designer.
Propositions 4 and 5 characterize the starting time and deadline which optimally balance the two eﬀects. The main predictions
are: (i) it is optimal to announce the contest immediately and (ii) the deadline of the contest should be relatively short. By
Proposition 6, these predictions extend if the contest designer also chooses the size of the prize.
The remainder of the paper studies the robustness of the predictions to changes in the main assumptions. By Propositions 7
and 8, the main predictions extend if contestants diﬀer in their eﬀort cost. In this case, the deadline helps to level the playing
ﬁeld as in Che and Gale (1998), Kirkegaard (2012), and Siegel (2014).
The main predictions also remain valid for a Tullock lottery contest success function. Thus, although the standard static
Tullock lottery contest and the static all-pay auction yield qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria, imposing optimality and taking the
time dimension into account establishes a much closer connection between the two contest success functions.
Both main predictions—the optimality of announcing the contest immediately and the relatively short deadline—do not
extend if the designer maximizes the highest discounted eﬀort of one participant. This goal function is prevalent in architecture
contests, where the contest designer can often only implement one proposal. In this case, an intermediate deadline is sometimes
optimal for the designer. Finally, the main results do not extend if the contest designer is more patient than the contestants. In
this case, she might still choose a relatively short duration of the contest, but to delay the announcement.
1.1 Related literature
The model can be seen as a modiﬁed war of attrition with discounting and a deadline.3 As in a standard war of attrition, the
player who stays in longer wins the prize and both players incur eﬀort cost independently of the outcome.
Compared to a war of attrition, however, the present paper reverses the informational assumptions, that is, no player can
observe his rival. Although a war of attrition captures applications such as animal conﬂicts (Bishop & Cannings, 1978; May-
nard Smith, 1974) or price wars (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986), applications of this model include job promotion contests, compe-
titions for grants, or design competitions, in which research is conducted secretly and the progress of all participants is evaluated
at the deadline; see also Taylor (1995) for a more detailed motivation and more applications.
The diﬀerent informational assumptions lead to a reversed timing structure in equilibrium: players exert eﬀort from a certain
time onwards. Hence, the player who starts earliest wins the game, whereas the player who persists longest wins in a war of
attrition. The resulting payoﬀs are pay-your-eﬀort rather than incurring the eﬀort cost of the player who resigns earlier. Finally,
diﬀering from a war of attrition which has a myriad of asymmetric equilibria, the present model has a unique equilibrium. Thus,
despite a similar game structure, the diﬀerent informational assumptions reverse many standard results.
Finally, the paper relates to a recent branch of literature on optimal deadlines started by Damiano, Li, and Wing (2012).
They analyze a war of attrition with private information and a common interest part and characterize the welfare maximizing
deadline. My focus, however, lies on the maximization of expected discounted total eﬀort. Lang, Seel, and Strack (2014) consider
a stochastic contest model with discrete jumps and without discounting. They provide a partial ranking of expected total eﬀort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, I derive the equilibrium of the
contest and the optimal starting time/deadline combination for the contest designer. Section 4 is devoted to diﬀerent extensions
of the main model. The results are summarized and discussed in Section 5. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 THE MODEL
Consider a model with a risk-neutral contest designer and 𝑖 = 1, 2 risk-neutral contestants. The contest designer decides on the
time 𝑇 (starting time) at which she announces the contest and on the time 𝑇 (deadline) at which the contest ends. The designer has
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an endowment 𝑃 , on which she collects interest at the interest rate 𝑟 until the deadline 𝑇 . At any point 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 , 𝑇 ], each contestant
decides whether to exert eﬀort 𝑒𝑖
𝑡
= 1 or not to exert eﬀort 𝑒𝑖
𝑡
= 0. The eﬀort decisions of each player are unobservable to his
rival. Exerting eﬀort induces a ﬂow cost of 𝑐, whereas no eﬀort induces no ﬂow cost.4 The net present value of total cost at time
𝑡 = 0 is thus − ∫ 𝑇
𝑇
𝑐𝑒𝑖
𝑡
exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡.5
At the contest deadline 𝑇 , the designer pays 𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 ) to the contestant who exerted most eﬀort. Thus, the net present value
at time 𝑡 = 0 of winning the prize is 𝑃 . In case of a tie, the prize is randomly allocated or split between the contestants.6 The
contest designer chooses 𝑇 and 𝑇 to maximize the expected discounted sum of eﬀorts 𝔼[exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
∑2
𝑖=1 ∫ 𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑡]. I solve the
contest using the Nash equilibrium concept, because no new information about the rival's strategy arrives over time.
3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, I compute the optimal starting time/deadline combination (𝑇 , 𝑇 ) for the contest designer. To do so, I ﬁrst derive
diﬀerent Nash equilibria in the contest depending on the parameters and relate it to all-pay auctions and wars of attrition. Second,
I determine the expected discounted total eﬀort for each parameter range in closed form. In the last step, I derive the starting
time/deadline combination, which maximizes expected discounted total eﬀort. For notational convenience, I henceforth omit
player labels whenever there is no risk of confusion.
3.1 Nash equilibria in the contest
If a contestant exerts eﬀort for a ﬁxed amount of time, due to the discounting, it is cheapest for him to start as late as possible.
This directly yields the following lemma which is stated without proof.
Lemma 1 (Delay). If a player exerts eﬀort on some interval (𝑠, ?̃?], then the player also exerts eﬀort for almost all 𝑡 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ].
Hence, the decision problem of each player reduces to ﬁnding a starting time 𝑠 ≥ 𝑇 such that the player exerts eﬀort at time
𝑡 if and only if 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 .
The next two lemmas are standard results in all-pay models; the proof of Lemma 2 is omitted because it directly follows from
the arguments in Baye et al. (1996).
Lemma 2 (No Interior Mass Point). In equilibrium, no player starts with strictly positive probability at a time 𝑇 < 𝑠 < 𝑇 . At
least one player starts before time 𝑇 with probability 1.
Lemma 3 (Zero Proﬁts). Assume that exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) > 𝑃𝑟2𝑐 . In any Nash equilibrium, both players make zero proﬁts.
Roughly speaking, the condition in Lemma 3 ensures the game to be long enough such that always exerting eﬀort might lead
to a negative proﬁt. In such cases, no contestant generates any equilibrium proﬁt.
The previous lemmas are helpful in deriving Nash equilibria for three diﬀerent parameter ranges in the next step. With slight
abuse of terminology, I deﬁne the contest duration by exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ).7
Proposition 1 (Short Duration). Assume that exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) ≤ 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 . In the unique Nash equilibrium, both players always
exert eﬀort, that is, 𝑠 = 𝑇 .
Proposition 2 (Intermediate Duration). Assume that 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
> exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) > 𝑃𝑟2𝑐 . In the unique Nash equilibrium, each
player randomizes his starting time 𝑠 according to the cumulative distribution function
𝐹 (𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑇
2
(
1 − 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
for all 𝑇 ≤ 𝑠 < ?̃?
1 − 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ]
1 for all 𝑠 > 𝑇 ,
where ?̃? = −1
𝑟
log(2 exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
).
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Proposition 3 (Long Duration). Assume that 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
≤ exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). In the unique Nash equilibrium, each player ran-
domizes the starting time 𝑠 according to the cumulative distribution function
𝐹 (𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ ?̂?
1 − 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ (?̂?, 𝑇 ]
1 for all 𝑠 > 𝑇 ,
where ?̂? = −1
𝑟
log(𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )).
3.2 Equilibria and their relation to the literature
The model has a close connection to two well-known models from the literature, wars of attrition, and all-pay auctions. Let me
ﬁrst discuss the relation to wars of attrition. For a short duration, both players exert eﬀort during the entire contest, which is also
the equilibrium in a war of attrition with a short deadline.
The equilibrium for an intermediate duration is also similar to the symmetric equilibrium of a war of attrition with an inter-
mediate deadline. More precisely, there is a positive probability that players exert eﬀort throughout the entire game; see, for
example, Bishop and Cannings (1978) or Hendricks et al. (1988). There is an interior interval in which no player starts with
positive probability, which corresponds to the interval in which no player resigns with positive probability in a war of attrition
with a deadline.
As for an intermediate duration, players also randomize on an interval to make their rivals indiﬀerent for a long duration. In
the latter case, however, no player exerts eﬀort throughout the entire time interval [𝑇 , 𝑇 ] with positive probability, because this
is too costly. This type of equilibrium does not arise in a war of attrition, where previous eﬀort cost become sunk.
The equilibrium construction has an even closer relation to all-pay auctions: suppose players are restricted to choose undom-
inated strategies, that is, they only exert eﬀort between a starting time 𝑠 and the deadline 𝑇 . The resulting reduced-form game
is isomorphic to an all-pay auction with a cost function 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐 ∫ 𝑥0 exp(−𝑟(𝑇 − 𝑡))𝑑𝑡—where a bid 𝑥 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 corresponds to a
starting time 𝑠—and a bid cap at ?̄? = 𝑇 − 𝑇 .
In their seminal paper, Che and Gale (1998) characterize equilibria for the three corresponding parameter regions for an all-
pay auction with a bid cap and a linear cost of bidding. The equilibrium construction in this section is a technical extension of
Che and Gale (1998) allowing for a speciﬁc nonlinear cost of bidding which results from the discounting.8
As the interest rate vanishes, the net present value of total cost converges to lim𝑟→0 − ∫ 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = − ∫ 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑡 and
the total cost of exerting eﬀort for 𝑥 units of time becomes linear, that is, lim𝑟→0 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐𝑥. Thus, as the interest rate goes to
zero, the equilibrium eﬀort time distributions converge to the equilibrium bidding distributions in Che and Gale (1998).9
If the interest rate equals zero, Lemma 1 is no longer valid and the contestants are indiﬀerent between any distribution with
the same total duration of exerting eﬀort. Thus, there are equilibria in which eﬀort is no longer exerted on a connected interval.10
The main diﬀerence from the standard all-pay auction model is conceptual: the designer's choice of starting time, deadline,
and prize aﬀects both the cost structure and the maximal feasible eﬀort level. Thus, despite the static nature of the interaction
in the contest, including the time dimension will be important to study the eﬀects of discounting. These eﬀects are absent in the
standard static setting and will be illustrated in the next section.
3.3 The designer's problem
We are now ready to tackle the designer's problem: Which starting time/deadline combination maximizes expected discounted
equilibrium eﬀort? For a short duration (Proposition 1), discounted total eﬀorts are
2∑
𝑖=1
∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑒𝑖
𝑡
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑑𝑡 = 2(𝑇 − 𝑇 ) exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). (1)
A closed-form solution for the other two regions of the parameter space is presented in the appendix. The direct approach
would be to maximize 𝑇 and 𝑇 on all three regions of the parameter space in order to ﬁnd local maxima and to compare them
across regions. This would, however, result in calculations that are diﬃcult to handle analytically for the latter two cases.
Instead, I use a diﬀerent approach in the next step to show that for any given 𝑇 , the optimal contest involves a 𝑇 such that the
resulting duration is short (Proposition 4). In a second step, I derive a closed-form solution for the optimal starting time/deadline
combination (𝑇 , 𝑇 ) (Proposition 5).
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Note that the maximal discounted eﬀort the designer can potentially generate with a deadline 𝑇 is 2𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). This function
attains its maximum at 𝑇 ∗ = 1
𝑟
. Thus, if both players exert eﬀort throughout the entire contest for 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
and 𝑇 = 0, setting
starting time and deadline in this way is the optimal solution. By Proposition 1, such an equilibrium exists and lies in the interior
of the range characterized in Proposition 1 if
1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) < 𝑃𝑟
2𝑐
. (2)
Plugging 𝑇 ∗ = 1
𝑟
into Equation (2), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The unique global maximum is attained at an interior solution for a short deadline and 𝑇 = 0 if 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 > 1 −
1
𝑒
.
The result is intuitive, because for a high interest rate, the designer wants to get the discovery quickly. Note that there is a
qualitative diﬀerence in the equilibrium for a short and an intermediate duration: in the latter case, contestants do not spend full
eﬀort with probability one. The undiscounted eﬀort for an intermediate duration also increases in 𝑇 , but at a smaller rate than
for a short duration. By the next proposition, expected discounted total eﬀort is always maximized for a short duration.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Starting Time).
(i) If either 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ≥ 1 or 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 < 1 and 𝑇 ≤ −1𝑟 log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the starting time 𝑇 = 0 maximizes total expected discounted eﬀort.
(ii) For 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 < 1 and 𝑇 > −
1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the starting time 𝑇 = −
1
𝑟
log(𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) maximizes total expected discounted
eﬀort.
Proof. Case (i) is trivial: both players exert eﬀort throughout the entire game (see equilibrium for a short duration), that is,
eﬀort is maximal.
For Case (ii), note that both players exert eﬀort at any time after 𝑇 in equilibrium. In the following, I show that setting 𝑇 as
described in the proposition yields the maximal possible discounted eﬀort of any scheme with maximal transfer 𝑃 and deadline
𝑇 which respects the participation constraints. Thereby, it is clearly also the optimal choice for the contest.
Let us maximize total eﬀort subject to the aggregate participation constraint, that is, the sum of the eﬀort cost should not
exceed the prize. By Lemma 1, I only need to ﬁnd the optimal starting times. Thus, I get
max
𝑠1,𝑠2
(𝑇 − 𝑠1) + (𝑇 − 𝑠2)
subject to
∫
𝑇
𝑠1
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + ∫
𝑇
𝑠2
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑃 .
The solution to this problem is 𝑠1 = 𝑠2 = −
1
𝑟
log(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) + 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the starting time 𝑇 in Case (ii). □
Thus, to ﬁnd the optimal (𝑇 , 𝑇 )-combination for the designer, it remains to ﬁnd the optimal 𝑇 . Note that if 𝑃 𝑟 ≥ 2𝑐 or
𝑃 𝑟 < 2𝑐 and 𝑇 ≤ −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the optimization problem is max 2𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). On the other hand, for 𝑃 𝑟 < 2𝑐 and 𝑇 >
−1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the optimization problem is max 2(𝑇 − 𝑇 ) exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). Plugging in the optimal 𝑇 from Proposition 4(ii), I obtain
max 2(𝑇 + 1
𝑟
log(𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))) exp(−𝑟𝑇 ).
Lemma 5. The function 2(𝑇 + 1
𝑟
log(𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))) exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) is decreasing in 𝑇 for all 𝑇 ≥ −1𝑟 log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ).
By Lemma 5, taking the optimal corresponding deadline 𝑇 as given, expected discounted total eﬀort is decreasing for any
duration such that 𝑇 > 0. This allows us to state the main result about the contest designer:
Proposition 5 (Optimal Starting Time and Deadline). The contest designer chooses the starting time 𝑇 = 0. If 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ≥ 1 − 1𝑒 ,
the optimal deadline is 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
. If 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 < 1 −
1
𝑒
, the optimal deadline is 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ).
Proof. By Proposition 4, the optimal starting time is 𝑇 = 0 for Case (i). By Lemma 5, the proﬁt is decreasing in 𝑇 for the
parameters considered in Case (ii) of Proposition 4. Thus, the optimal 𝑇 in this case is also chosen such that 𝑇 = 0. Because
these cases contain all parameters, I obtain 𝑇 = 0.
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To prove the second part of the statement, recall that the proﬁt is increasing for a short duration until 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
. Thus, 𝑇 is either
the interior maximum 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
if 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 > 1 −
1
𝑒
or the corner solution 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ) otherwise, that is, the maximal 𝑇 such
that 𝑇 = 0 is optimal. □
The optimal deadline in the ﬁrst case is an interior solution. Intuitively, 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
is the point at which the relative increase in
total eﬀort is exactly oﬀset by the relative loss due to waiting. The second case is the largest possible deadline that remains
within the parameter space of short deadlines (corner solution). Here, increasing the deadline further does not increase expected
discounted total eﬀort because the parameter region switches to an intermediate deadline. To sum up, the model yields a clear
prediction: it is always optimal to start the contest without any delay and the deadline of the contest should be short enough such
that both contestants choose to exert eﬀort throughout the entire contest. This diﬀers from the results in Che and Gale (1998)
where a bid cap might increase expenditures only for an asymmetric setting.
3.4 Variable prize
So far, we have assumed that the endowment of the contest designer is ﬁxed. Although this covers applications in which a
principal endows the designer with a certain budget, there are other cases in which the designer not only chooses the starting
time and deadline, but also has to pay for the prize. Thus, the designer chooses the optimal contest for the goal function
max
𝑇 ,𝑇 ,𝑃
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝔼
( 2∑
𝑖=1
∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑒𝑡
𝑖
𝑑𝑡
)
− 𝑃 . (3)
For this goal function, we obtain the following characterization.
Proposition 6. Suppose the contest designer maximizes Equation (3).
(i) If 𝑐 ≥ 1, any contest with a prize 𝑃 > 0 yields a negative value of the designer's goal function. Thus, the designer should
not hold a contest at all.
(ii) If 𝑐 < 1, the optimal solution is given by 𝑃 = (1 − exp(𝑐 − 1)) 2𝑐
𝑟
, 𝑇 = 0 and 𝑇 = 1−𝑐
𝑟
. The resulting proﬁt of the designer
is Π = 2
𝑟
(exp(𝑐 − 1) − 𝑐) > 0.
Proof. Proposition 5 contains the optimal starting time and deadline for every given prize. Thus, taking the resulting values as
given, it remains to ﬁnd the optimal prize. Note that we only need to consider values of 𝑃 such that 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ≤ 1 − 1𝑒 , because higher
prizes would not increase eﬀort by Proposition 5. Thus, plugging 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ) and 𝑇 = 0 into Equation (3) yields
Π(𝑃 ) = −2
𝑟
log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
)(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
)
− 𝑃 .
The ﬁrst-order condition is
𝑑Π(𝑃 )
𝑑𝑃
= 1
𝑐
(
1 + log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
))
− 1 = 0,
which reduces to 𝑃 = (1 − exp(𝑐 − 1)) 2𝑐
𝑟
.
Thus, 𝑃 is positive if and only if 𝑐 < 1 (the fact that 𝑃 is the maximum follows from the second-order condition or a sign test).
This establishes Part (i) of the proposition. For Part (ii), plug the value for 𝑃 back into the expression for 𝑇 to obtain 𝑇 = 1−𝑐
𝑟
.
Plugging 𝑃 and 𝑇 into the goal function of the designer, I get 2
𝑟
(exp(𝑐 − 1) − 𝑐) > 0. □
The contest designer does not treat the prize as given as in the previous section, but bears the cost of a prize increase himself.
Thus, she has to balance the higher induced eﬀort against the cost of providing a higher prize. If eﬀort costs are too high as in
(i), any contest with a positive prize results in a loss, that is, 𝑃 = 0 (no contest) is optimal. If the optimal contest yields a positive
proﬁt, the resulting deadline is short and reduces even further compared to Proposition 5, because 𝑇 = 1−𝑐
𝑟
<
1
𝑟
.
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4 EXTENSIONS
In this section, I consider how robust the predictions about the optimal contest starting time and deadline are to diﬀerent changes
in the model.
4.1 Asymmetric cost functions
As in the baseline model, two players compete for the prize as described in Section 2. Diﬀering from that model, however,
players now have diﬀerent ﬂow costs, without loss of generality 𝑐1 < 𝑐2.
The reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1 implies that there is a (unique) Nash equilibrium in which both players exert eﬀort
throughout the entire contest if this leads to a (strictly) positive proﬁt for both players. If this condition is satisﬁed for player 2,
then it is also satisﬁed for player 1 who has lower ﬂow cost.11 Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 7. Assume that exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) ≤ 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐2 . In the Nash equilibrium, both players always exert eﬀort, that is,
𝑠 = 𝑇 .
The following proposition extends the main result to asymmetric costs.
Proposition 8. The contest designer chooses the starting time 𝑇 = 0. If 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐2 ≥ 1 − 𝑒, the optimal deadline is 𝑇 = 1𝑟 . If 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐2 <
1 − 𝑒, the optimal deadline is 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐2 ).
Establishing optimality of a short duration is more complicated than in the symmetric setting, because the optimal contest is no
longer a ﬁrst-best scheme as in the proof of Proposition 4. Instead, the proof of Proposition 8 derives the equilibrium distributions
for all possible parameters and bounds the corresponding expected eﬀorts using results from the symmetric setting. Intuitively,
in the asymmetric case, a short duration has the additional beneﬁt of leveling the playing ﬁeld between unequal contestants as
in Che and Gale (1998) and thus remains optimal.
4.2 Tullock lottery contest success function
So far, I have assumed that the player who exerts most eﬀort wins the contest with probability 1. I now extend the analysis to a
Tullock lottery contest success function, that is, each player's probability of winning the contest is proportional to his share in
the total eﬀort (with the usual convention that the winning probability is
1
2 if total eﬀort is 0).
As before, due to the discounting, the optimal decision of a player reduces to ﬁnding a starting time 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 𝑇 such that 𝑒𝑡𝑖 = 1
if and only if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑠𝑖. The optimization problem of player 𝑖 thus simpliﬁes to
max
𝑠𝑖
𝑃
𝑇 − 𝑠𝑖
2𝑇 − 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗
− ∫
𝑇
𝑠𝑖
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡.
The ﬁrst derivative of this function is
𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑠𝑖
= 𝑃
𝑠𝑗 − 𝑇
(2𝑇 − 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗)2
+ 𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑠𝑖).
If 𝑇 = 0, always eﬀort by both players is the Nash equilibrium if nobody beneﬁts from increasing his starting time:12
𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑠𝑖
(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗 = 0) ≤ 𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑠𝑖
(𝑠𝑖 = 0, 𝑠𝑗 = 0) = 𝑃
−𝑇
(2𝑇 )2
+ 𝑐 ≤ 0, that is, if 𝑃
𝑐𝑇
≥ 4.
If always eﬀort by both players is not a Nash equilibrium, I obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium by setting
𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑠𝑖
(𝑠1 = 𝑠2 = 𝑠) = 𝑃
𝑠 − 𝑇
(2𝑇 − 2𝑠)2
+ 𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑠) = 0,
which yields
exp(−𝑟𝑠)(𝑇 − 𝑠) = 𝑃
4𝑐
.
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Thus,
𝑠 =
𝑟𝑇 −𝑊
(
𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 )𝑟
4𝑐
)
𝑟
,
where W denotes the Lambert W Function.
Unlike the all-pay contest success function, a Tullock lottery contest success function always admits a (unique) symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium in which both contestants exert eﬀort after a certain starting time. Thus, a restriction on 𝑇 (weakly)
reduces eﬀort. Hence, without loss of optimality, I henceforth set 𝑇 = 0. To ﬁnd the global maximum, I only need to compare the
eﬀort on two intervals: for 𝑇 ≤ 𝑃4𝑐 , the eﬀort of each contestant is 𝑇 , whereas for 𝑇 > 𝑃4𝑐 , the eﬀort of each contestant is 𝑇 − 𝑠 =
𝑊 ( 𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 )𝑟4𝑐 )
𝑟
. For the ﬁrst interval, I obtain 𝑇 ∗ = 1
𝑟
as before. For the second interval, one has to maximize
𝑊 ( 𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 )𝑟4𝑐 )
𝑟
exp(−𝑟𝑇 ).
The ﬁrst derivative of this function with respect to 𝑇 is
−
𝑟 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑊
(
𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 )𝑟
4𝑐
)2
𝑊
(
𝑃 exp(𝑟𝑇 )𝑟
4𝑐 + 1
) < 0,
because 𝑊 (𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 > 0. Thus, it is never optimal to choose 𝑇 > 𝑃4𝑐 . Summing up, I obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 9. The optimal starting time is 𝑇 = 0. The optimal deadline is 𝑇 = 1
𝑟
if 1
𝑟
<
𝑃
4𝑐 and 𝑇 =
𝑃
4𝑐 otherwise.
The optimal equilibrium for a Tullock contest success function is qualitatively similar to the one for the all-pay contest success
function, with small diﬀerences in the parameter ranges.
4.3 Diﬀerent goal functions of the contest designer
The related literature mainly focuses on two diﬀerent goal functions of the contest designer: maximizing expected total eﬀort
as analyzed in the main part and maximizing the expected maximum eﬀort; see, for example, Taylor (1995), Moldovanu and
Sela (2001), or Seel and Wasser (2014). The latter goal function describes applications such as architecture contests, where the
contest designer only implements one of the submitted ideas. The next proposition provides a characterization, which shows
that short deadlines need not be optimal in this case.
Proposition 10. Suppose the contest designer maximizes the discounted expected maximum eﬀort exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
{𝔼(max{∫ 𝑇
𝑇
𝑒𝑡1𝑑𝑡, ∫ 𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑡2𝑑𝑡})}. The maximal discounted eﬀort is obtained for 𝑇 = 0 and a short deadline if and only if
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 ≥ 1 − 1𝑒 .
For
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 ≥ 1 − 1𝑒 , the global maximum is still attained for a short deadline with 𝑇 = 0. On the other hand, for 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 < 1 − 1𝑒 ,
discounted total eﬀort continues to increase as the parameters switch from a short to an intermediate deadline. Intuitively, at an
intermediate deadline, there is still a high likelihood that at least one player exerts eﬀort throughout the entire contest.
As another application, consider arms races during wars. Here, (prize) money might only play a secondary role. As such,
consider a contest designer who lexicographically cares ﬁrst about maximizing total eﬀort and second about her costs. To
generate the maximal eﬀort for a given time frame [0, 𝑇 ], the designer needs to choose 𝑇 = 0 and 𝑃 ≥ 2𝑐
𝑟
(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )).
Taking the lexicographic preference for a lower prize into account, we obtain 𝑃 = 2𝑐
𝑟
(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )). Intuitively, because agents
already exert maximal eﬀort at that value, increasing the prize further does not increase eﬀort.
4.4 Diﬀerent discount factors
Up to now, I have implicitly assumed that the discount rate of the contest designer satisﬁes 𝛿 = 11+𝑟 . If she is less patient, that is,
𝛿 <
1
1+𝑟 , the qualitative results of the paper continue to hold. Intuitively, a short deadline becomes even more attractive, because
the contest designer urgently needs the output. On the other hand, if the contest designer is more patient, that is, 𝛿 >
1
1+𝑟 , the
results might break down: keeping the duration of the contest constant, a later starting time means lower costs for the same prize
(both discounted back to 𝑇 = 0). In turn, competition ensures that contestants exert eﬀort for a longer time period in equilibrium.
In the main model, this eﬀect is more than oﬀset by the increased waiting time for the designer. But if her patience is suﬃciently
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high, the eﬀect from reducing cost for the contestants becomes dominant. In this case, a contest with a positive starting time and
a short duration is optimal.
For the contestants, I have also assumed that their eﬀort costs shrink at the discount rate. There are several reasons why
(perceived) eﬀort costs are decreasing over time. For instance, for innovation contests, think about technological progress or a
lower opportunity cost in the future due to urgent upcoming deadlines for other projects. For competitions in schools, students
might perceive future eﬀort cost lower and procrastinate. The main results continue to hold as long as eﬀort costs shrink, but at
most at the speed of the discount rate. If eﬀort costs shrink faster than the discount rate, for example, due to rapid technological
progress, the designer might prefer to delay announcing the contest.
5 DISCUSSION
The main conceptual contribution of the paper consists of setting up the model and recognizing that (i) the contest is a war of
attrition in which participants cannot observe each other and (ii) the strategic incentives are isomorphic to those in an all-pay
auction with a bid cap and a speciﬁc nonlinear cost of bidding. The equilibrium derivation for the contest stage provides a small
technical extension of Che and Gale (1998). More important, in contrast to the bid cap in Che and Gale (1998), the contest
starting time and deadline inﬂuence the cost structure due to discounting.
In Che and Gale (1998), a bid cap can only lead to an increase in lobbying expenditures—their interpretation for the bid—
for asymmetric valuations. Here, the discounting makes a short duration optimal for the contest designer for symmetric and
asymmetric marginal cost.
From an applied point of view, Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) criticize that constraints on lobbying expenditures as modeled
in Che and Gale (1998) are diﬃcult to monitor and their results do not extend for a nonbinding cap. For the applications in
this paper such as examinations in schools and tenure decisions in law ﬁrms, a similar critique seems less appealing, because a
binding deadline for tests in schools or tenure decisions can be easily enforced.
Finally, let me mention two testable predictions of the model. For examinations in schools, empirical results show the females
perform better on average than males. Data-driven explanations include diﬀerent valuations for winning (Chen, Ong, and
Sheremeta, 2015) or a diﬀerence in self-discipline Duckworth and Seligman (2006), that is, the perceived time-discount rate.
Thus, if skills are homogeneous, this gender gap should disappear for a suﬃciently short exam-relevant period.
In architecture contests, the designer often only implements the best proposal. Such contests are predicted to have longer
deadlines compared to contests in which total eﬀort is important for the designer.
ENDNOTES
1 For the former category, see, for example, Tullock (1980), Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1996), Konrad (2002), Siegel (2009a,b), and Alcalde and Dahm (2010); for the latter category, see, for example, Taylor (1995) and Seel and Strack
(2013, 2016).
2 This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.4.
3 The war of attrition was introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) and has been extensively studied since then; seminal papers include Hendricks, Weiss,
and Wilson (1988), Krishna and Morgan (1997), and Bulow and Klemperer (1999).
4 The main results extend if—instead of the binary eﬀort choice—each player picks an eﬀort intensity 𝜆 at a linear cost 𝑐(𝜆) = 𝑐𝜆 with 𝜆 ∈ [0, ?̄?] at
any point in time.
5 Section 4.4 contains a detailed discussion about the implied assumptions on discounting.
6 If the prize is split, the main results extend for risk-averse contestants.
7 I use the term duration, because the term increases in 𝑇 and decreases in 𝑇 , but contrary to the standard use, the duration is not equal to 𝑇 − 𝑇 .
8 To the best of my knowledge, there is no direct result in the literature, which covers a general class of cost functions in the complete information
case. A treatment for nonlinear cost functions in the incomplete information case is presented in Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002). The recent
literature on all-pay auctions with bid caps considers other extensions of Che and Gale (1998): Szech (2015) considers diﬀerent tie-breaking rules
and Hart (2016) introduces caps of unequal size to the general class of Lotto games.
9 Che and Gale (1998) allow for heterogeneous valuations. This case is covered by Section 4.1, where the valuations 𝑣𝑖 in Che and Gale (1998)
correspond to 𝑣𝑖 =
𝑃
𝑐𝑖
here.
10 For a negative interest rate 𝑟, that is, if eﬀort today is less costly than eﬀort tomorrow, Lemma 1 reverses and contestants start to exert eﬀort as early
as possible and instead choose a time at which they stop. The rest of the derivation proceeds along the same lines as the paper.
128 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
11 The set of equilibria for the boundary case exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) = 𝑃𝑟
2𝑐2
diﬀers from the symmetric setting: there is continuum of Nash equilibria in
which player 1 exerts full eﬀort with probability one and player 2 mixes between no eﬀort and full eﬀort. In line with the standard convention from
the industrial organization literature, I select the full eﬀort equilibrium for this case.
12 Existence and uniqueness of all equilibria in this section follows from Theorem 1 in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3. There exists no equilibrium in which both players start at 𝑠 = 𝑇 with positive probability and at least
one player starts at 𝑠 = 𝑇 with probability 1, because this would entail a negative proﬁt for the other player. By Lemma 2, at
least one player places no mass point/atom at 𝑠 = 𝑇 and no player places a mass point in (𝑇 , 𝑇 ). Combining the two previous
statements, we see that starting at the supremum of the starting times ?̄? = sup{𝑠 ∶ ∃𝑖 𝑠.𝑡. 𝐹𝑖(𝑠) < 1} loses with probability 1.
Thus, by continuity, player 𝑖, without loss of generality player 2, gets a proﬁt of (at most) zero.
By standard arguments, both players randomize their starting times with a positive density on the same intervals (otherwise,
one player could increase his starting time on that interval and obtain the same winning probability at a lower cost).
Case 1: Exactly one player starts with positive probability at 𝑠 = 𝑇 .
In this case, there exists an 𝜖 > 0 such that the rival does not start in an interval (𝑇 , 𝑇 + 𝜖) with positive probability,
because starting at 𝑇 instead would increase the expected proﬁt. Hence, the ﬁrst player has an incentive to start at
𝑠 = 𝑇 + 𝜖2 instead of 𝑠 = 𝑇 , because both starting times guarantee him to win with probability 1, but the latter one
induces a higher cost. This contradicts the equilibrium assumption.
Case 2: Both players start with positive probability 𝑚 ∈ (0, 1) at 𝑠 = 𝑇 .
Towards a contradiction assume that player 1 makes a positive proﬁt. This entails 𝐹1(𝑇 ) > 𝐹2(𝑇 ), because player
1 has a higher equilibrium proﬁt. By the argument in Case 1, there exists an 𝜖 > 0 such that no player starts with
positive probability in (𝑇 , 𝑇 + 𝜖). Because both players randomize with positive density on the same intervals, I can
deﬁne ?̃? = inf {𝑠 ∶ 𝐹𝑖(𝑠) > 𝐹𝑖(𝑇 )}. By optimality and continuity, both players are indiﬀerent between starting at 𝑇 and
at ?̃?, which leads to a contradiction, because the gain of player 2 from starting at 𝑇 instead of ?̃? is higher, because
𝐹1(𝑇 ) > 𝐹2(𝑇 ).
Case 3: No player starts with positive probability at 𝑠 = 𝑇 .
Toward a contradiction assume that player 1 makes a positive proﬁt, in particular by choosing the lowest starting time
contained in the support of his randomization. Thus, player 2 also makes a positive proﬁt by starting at the lowest
starting time in the randomization of player 1, because it guarantees him to win with probability 1 incurring the same
cost as player 1. This contradicts the equilibrium assumption. □
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence: If both players exert eﬀort during the entire game, both win the prize with probability 12 .
For any (pure strategy) deviation, a player wins the prize with probability 0, because the rival exerts more eﬀort in this case.
Thus, the best possible deviation is to exert no eﬀort at all, which leads to a proﬁt of 0. The equilibrium proﬁt is greater or equal
to the proﬁt from the best deviation if
𝑃
2
− ∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0 .
This equation simpliﬁes to exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) ≤ 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 .
Uniqueness: There exists no equilibrium in which a player starts at a time 𝑇 < 𝑠 < 𝑇 with positive probability by Lemma 2.
Toward a contradiction, consider an equilibrium in which at least one player does not start at 𝑠 = 𝑇 with probability 1. Then,
by Lemma 2, the supremum of the starting times of one player loses with probability 1, that is, by continuity, the proﬁt at least
one player, say player 2, is zero. I distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Player 1 starts at time 𝑡 = 𝑇 with probability 1.
As I have argued in the existence part, it is not optimal for player 2 to start with positive probability in (𝑇 , 𝑇 ) against the
strategy of player 1. Thus, the remaining candidates for an equilibrium strategy of player 2 place mass 𝑚 ∈ [0, 1) at 𝑠 = 𝑇 (full
eﬀort) and 1 − 𝑚 at 𝑠 = 𝑇 (no eﬀort). Note that no eﬀort leads to strictly lower proﬁt for player 2 if exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) < 𝑃𝑟2𝑐 .
Thus, in this case, 𝑚 = 1 is a proﬁtable deviation.
To complete the proof of Case 1, we have to rule out a diﬀerent equilibrium for the boundary case exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) = 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐
and 𝑚 < 1. Compare the proﬁt of player 1 from 𝑠 = 𝑇 to 𝑠 = 𝑇 − 𝜖 to get
𝜋1(𝑇 − 𝜖) − 𝜋1(𝑇 ) = (1 − 𝑚)𝑃 − ∫
𝑇
𝑇−𝜖
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 −
(
1 − 𝑚
2
)
𝑃 + ∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 .
130 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
We can simplify this equation and then plug in 𝑐 = 𝑃 𝑟2(exp(−𝑟𝑇 )−exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) (rewritten expression for the boundary case) to obtain
𝜋1(𝑇 − 𝜖) − 𝜋1(𝑇 ) = 𝑃
2
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟(𝑇 − 𝜖))
exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
− 𝑚
)
. (A1)
As 𝜖 → 0, the fraction in the brackets of Equation (A1) converges to 1. Thus, by continuity, for any 𝑚 ∈ [0, 1), there exists an
𝜖 > 0, such that starting at 𝑠 = 𝑇 − 𝜖 is strictly better for player 1 than starting at 𝑠 = 𝑇 . This contradicts the initial assumption
that player 1 starts at 𝑇 with probability 1.
Case 2: Player 1 does not start at 𝑡 = 𝑇 with probability 1.
Recall that player 2 makes zero proﬁt for his supposed equilibrium strategy. Consider the deviation which starts at time
𝑡 = 𝑇 for player 2. This strategy guarantees a winning probability above 12 , because player 1 does not start at time 𝑡 = 𝑇 with
probability 1. Hence,
𝜋2(𝑠 = 𝑇 ) > 𝑃
2
− ∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0 ,
that is, player 2 has a proﬁtable deviation. □
Proof of Proposition 2. If a player does not start at 𝑠 = 𝑇 with positive probability, the other player can start at 𝑠 = 𝑇 and
make a positive proﬁt, which violates Lemma 3. Hence, both players have to start at 𝑠 = 𝑇 with positive probability. This entails
zero proﬁts if
∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃
(
𝐹 (𝑇 )
2
+ 1 − 𝐹 (𝑇 )
)
= 𝑃
(
1 −
𝐹 (𝑇 )
2
)
.
Thus,
𝐹 (𝑇 ) = 2
(
1 − 𝑐
𝑟𝑃
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
.
Because a player who starts at 𝑠 > 𝑇 can only win against a player who starts after 𝑇 , no player starts for 𝑠 ∈ (𝑇 , ?̃?), because
𝑃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑠)) − ∫
𝑇
𝑠
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑇 )) − ∫
𝑇
𝑠
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 < 0.
For 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ], the zero proﬁt condition implies
𝑃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑠)) − ∫
𝑇
𝑠
𝑐 exp(−𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 0 .
Rearranging, I obtain
𝐹 (𝑠) = 1 − 𝑐
𝑟𝑃
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) . (A2)
□
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 3, both players make zero proﬁts. Moreover, they randomize with positive density on the
same intervals. This uniquely determines the equilibrium distributions for 𝑠 ≥ ?̂? by Equation (A2). No player has an incentive
to start at a time 𝑠 < ?̂?, because the costs exceed the prize in this case. □
Equilibrium eﬀorts for an intermediate or long duration
To obtain the values for an intermediate duration, I derive expected eﬀorts for the case considered in Proposition 2:
𝔼
( 2∑
𝑖=1
∫
𝑇
𝑇
𝑒𝑖
𝑡
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑑𝑡
)
= 2 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
(
2
(
1 − 𝑐
𝑟𝑃
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
(𝑇 − 𝑇 ) + ∫
𝑇
?̃?
𝑓 (𝑡)(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡
)
.
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Note that
∫
𝑇
?̃?
𝑓 (𝑡)(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑐
𝑝 ∫
𝑇
?̃?
exp(−𝑟𝑡)(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡.
Integration by parts yields
𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
[(
2 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
)(
𝑇 + 1
𝑟
log
(
2 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
)
− 1
𝑟
)
+ 1
𝑟
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
]
.
Thus, the expected discounted sum of eﬀorts which the designer collects for an intermediate duration is given by
Π(𝑇 ) =
2∑
𝑖=1
∫
𝑇
0
𝑒𝑖
𝑡
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑑𝑡 = 2 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
(
2
(
1 − 𝑐
𝑟𝑃
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
(𝑇 − 𝑇 )
+ 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
[(
2 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
)(
𝑇 + 1
𝑟
log
(
2 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
)
− 1
𝑟
)
+ 1
𝑟
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
])
.
It remains to consider the discounted sum of eﬀorts for the equilibrium for a long duration, which I derived in Proposition 3:
Π(𝑇 ) =
2∑
𝑖=1
∫
𝑇
?̂?
𝑒𝑖
𝑡
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑑𝑡 = 2 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
(
𝑇 − 1
𝑟
+ 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(
𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) + 1
𝑟
log
(
𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
)(
𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
)))
.
Proof of Lemma 5. We have to show that the function
Π(𝑇 ) = 2
(
𝑇 + 1
𝑟
log
(
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
))
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
is decreasing in 𝑇 for all 𝑇 ≥ −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ).
The ﬁrst derivative of this function (dropping the 2 which is irrelevant for the sign of the derivative) is given by
𝑑Π(𝑇 )
𝑑𝑇
= exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
(
1 −
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
− 𝑟𝑇 − log
(
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
))
.
This derivative is negative if and only if the second term 𝑔(𝑇 ) = 1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 +exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
− 𝑟𝑇 − log(𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) is negative.
Because it is not straightforward to see this from the equation, I proceed in two steps: First, I show that 𝑔(𝑇 ) is negative at the
minimal admissible value of 𝑇 . In the second step, 𝑔(𝑇 ) is shown to be negative for all 𝑇 above the minimal value.
Step 1: At 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), the equation reduces to
𝑔(𝑇 ) =
(
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
+ log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
))
< 0.
Step 2: The derivative of 𝑔(𝑇 ) is given by
𝑑𝑔(𝑇 )
𝑑𝑇
= 𝑟
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣−1 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐(
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
)2 + 1𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 + exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Rearranging, we obtain
𝑑𝑔(𝑇 )
𝑑𝑇
= 𝑟
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣−1 +
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
+ exp(−2𝑟𝑇 )
exp(−𝑟𝑇 )𝑃 𝑟
𝑐
+ exp(−2𝑟𝑇 ) +
(
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
)2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ < 0,
because the fraction is smaller than 1.
Thus, 𝑔(𝑇 ) is negative at 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ) and decreasing afterward, that is, 𝑔(𝑇 ) is negative for all 𝑇 ≥ −1𝑟 log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ).
Hence, 𝑑Π(𝑇 )
𝑑𝑇
is negative, which means that Π(𝑇 ) is decreasing in 𝑇 for all 𝑇 ≥ −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ). □
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Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is split up into two steps.
Step 1: I ﬁrst derive the equilibrium distributions for an intermediate and long duration in Lemmas 6 and 7. In both cases, I
omit the uniqueness part in the proof, because it proceeds along the lines of the proof for symmetric cost functions: ﬁrst,
establish that the proﬁts of both players are ﬁxed in equilibrium. Then ﬁnd the unique distributions which yield these
proﬁts for any starting time in the support and lower proﬁts for any other starting time.
Lemma 6. Assume that 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐2
> exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) > 𝑃𝑟2𝑐2 . In the unique Nash equilibrium, players randomize their starting
times according to the cumulative distribution functions
𝐹1(𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑇
2
(
1 − 𝑐2
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
for all 𝑇 ≤ 𝑠 < ?̃?
1 − 𝑐2
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ]
1 for all 𝑠 > 𝑇
and
𝐹2(𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑇
2
(
𝑐1
𝑐2
− 𝑐1
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))
)
for all 𝑇 ≤ 𝑠 < ?̃?
𝑐1
𝑐2
− 𝑐1
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ (?̃?, 𝑇 )
1 for all 𝑠 ≥ 𝑇 ,
where ?̃? = −1
𝑟
log(2 exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐2
).
Proof. Note that 𝜋1(𝑠) = 𝑃 (1 − 𝑐1𝑐2 ) for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ) and smaller otherwise and that 𝜋2(𝑠) = 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ] and smaller
otherwise. Because each starting time contained in the randomization of each player is an optimal strategy against the rival's
distribution, the strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. □
Lemma 7. Assume that 𝑃 𝑟
𝑐2
≤ exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ). In the unique Nash equilibrium, players randomize their starting times
according to the cumulative distribution functions
𝐹1(𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ ?̂?
1 − 𝑐2
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ (?̂?, 𝑇 ]
1 for all 𝑠 > 𝑇
and
𝐹2(𝑠) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 for all 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ ?̂?
𝑐1
𝑐2
− 𝑐1
𝑃 𝑟
(exp(−𝑟𝑠) − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )) for all 𝑠 ∈ (?̂?, 𝑇 )
1 for all 𝑠 ≥ 𝑇 ,
where ?̂? = −1
𝑟
log(𝑃 𝑟
𝑐2
+ exp(−𝑟𝑇 )).
Proof. Note that 𝜋1(𝑠) = 𝑃 (1 − 𝑐1𝑐2 ) for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ) and smaller otherwise and that 𝜋2(𝑠) = 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑇 ] and smaller
otherwise. Because each starting time contained in the randomization of each player is an optimal strategy against the rival's
distribution, the strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. □
Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 8: In both Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, the starting distribution of player 2 stochastically
dominates the distribution of player 1. Thus, player 1 exerts a higher expected eﬀort, that is, we can bound the expected eﬀort of
player 2 by the expected eﬀort of player 1. For any duration, player 1 uses the same equilibrium distributions as in the symmetric
setting (with 𝑐2 = 𝑐) and for a short duration, both players use the same equilibrium distributions as in the symmetric setting.
Thus, expected eﬀort in the asymmetric setting is the same as in the symmetric setting for a short deadline and lower otherwise.
Because a short deadline is optimal in the symmetric setting, it remains optimal in the asymmetric setting. The remainder of the
proof for 𝑇 = 0 and the optimal value of 𝑇 is identical to the proof in the symmetric setting. □
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Proof of Proposition 10. For 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ≥ 1 − 1𝑒 , the optimal solution is still attained for a short deadline and 𝑇 = 0, because the
maximal possible eﬀort is used in the maximization leading to Lemma 4.
For the reverse direction, denote the discounted expected eﬀort for the starting time 𝑇 = 0 by Π(𝑇 ). Note that for an inter-
mediate duration, we obtain
Π(𝑇 ) ≥ ℙ
(
max
{
∫
𝑇
0
𝑒𝑡1𝑑𝑡,∫
𝑇
0
𝑒𝑡2𝑑𝑡
}
= 𝑇
)
𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
= (2𝐹 (0) − 𝐹 (0)2)𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
= 4𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(
1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ) − 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))2
)
𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
and that the ﬁrst inequality holds with equality for 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), that is, the highest value of T for which both players
exert full eﬀort with probability one. Thus,
𝑑Π
𝑑𝑇
(
𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
)) ≥ 4𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
((1 − 𝑟𝑇 ) exp(−𝑟𝑇 )(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 )
− 𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))2)) + 𝑇 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )(𝑟 exp(−𝑟𝑇 )(1 − 2𝑐
𝑃 𝑟
(1 − exp(−𝑟𝑇 ))))).
Plugging in 𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ), we obtain
𝑑Π
𝑑𝑇
(
𝑇 = −1
𝑟
log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
))
=
(
1 + log
(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
))(
1 − 𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐
)
,
which is positive if log(1 − 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 ) > 0, that is, if
𝑃 𝑟
2𝑐 < 1 −
1
𝑒
. Thus, for 𝑃 𝑟2𝑐 < 1 − 𝑒, the payoﬀ continues to increase as the parame-
ters switch from a short to an intermediate deadline (and, by continuity, also for some interval of intermediate deadlines). This
contradicts optimality of 𝑇 = 0 and a short deadline. □
